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CHARLES KORNOFF et al., Respondents, v. KINGSBURG 
COTTON OIL COMPANY Corporation) Appellant. 
[1] Trespass-Damages.-Where a trespass to land is of a perma-
nent nature, all damages, past and prospective, are recoverable 
in one action, but where the trespass is temporary in character, 
only those damages may be recovered which have accrued up 
to the time of commencement of the action, since it is not to 
be presumed that the trespass will continue. 
[2] Nuisances-Damages.-Under the rule that where injunctive 
relief is not appropriate or where successive actions are unde-
sirable either to plaintiff or defendant or both the nuisance 
may be considered permanent, property owners suing for all 
damages, past, present and future arising from quantities of 
fumes, vapors, dust, etc., being emitted from a cotton gin 
operated on adjacent property may recover such damages. 
[3] Id.-Pleading.-Where plaintiffs' amended complaint against 
the owner and operator of a cotton gin shows that the comfort 
and enjoyment of the plaintiffs and their family have been 
diminished to the extent that they have been unable to live 
normally and peacefully and follow ordinary pursuits, that 
the use of their shop has been seriously curtailed due to the 
said dust and cotton lint particles and plaintiffs have been 
deprived of the full value of same, and that they have 
suffered severe nervous distress and mental anguish, such 
pleading is sufficient to permit damages for discomfort and 
anguish if such damages are otherwise proper. 
[4] Id.-Damages.-Discomfort and annoyance suffered by plain-
tiffs from defendant's cotton gin operated on adjacent property 
is an injury directly and proximately caused by defendant's 
invasion of their property, and such damages would naturally 
result from such an invasion. 
[5] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Once a cause of action 
for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of land 
may recover damages for annoyance and discomfort that 
would naturally ensue therefrom. 
[6) Id.-Da1nages.-Where plaintiffs' lawns, flowers, shrubs, win-
dow screens, hedges and furniture were covered with a thick 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trespass, § 35 et seq. Am.Jur .• Trespass, § 49 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trespass, § 28; (::!, 4, 6) Nuisances, 
§62; [3] Nuisances, §50; [5] Nuisances, §62; Trespass, §26; 
[7, 8] Nuisances, § 62; Trespass, § 28. 
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coating of dust and lint and ginning waste from a cotton gin 
owned and operated by defendant on adjacent property, the 
annoyance and discomfort suffered by plaintiffs as a result of 
such ·injury to their real property was a natural consequence 
thereof. 
[7] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Where a person is en-
titled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past 
invasion and not amounting to a total destruction in value, the 
damages include compensation for discomfort and annoyance 
in an action brought by the occupant. 
[8] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Whether the case in-
volves a nuisance or a trespass, an award of damages may be 
allowed for discomfort and annoyance where the only injury 
is to real property, since such an injury may cause discomfort 
and annoyance without also causing an actual physical injury 
to the person. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. Philip Conley, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages resulting from operation of a cotton 
gin on land adjacent to plaintiffs' property. Judgment for 
plaintiffs affirmed. 
David S. Davis and Charles Ray Barrett for Appellant. 
James C. Janjigian, N. Lindsey South and L. Kenneth Say 
for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant Kingsburg Cotton Oil Company 
appeals from an adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict 
given after it had been granted a limited new trial on the 
sole issue of damages. No appeal was taken from the order 
granting the limited new trial. 
Defendant owns and operates a cotton gin on land adjacent 
to plaintiffs' property which is used for residential purposes 
and the operation of a planing mill. The area in question 
was zoned for business and commercial purposes. Defendant 
is engaged in the business of ginning lint cotton and process-
ing cottonseed, which lasts approximately six months of each 
year. During the ginning season, plaintiffs alleged that large 
quantities of fumes, vapors, dust, dirt, sediment, lint and 
waste materials were emitted into the atmosphere and pen-
etrated into the house and shop, covering them with an 
offensive, injurious and adhesive coating of dust, lint and 
ginning waste and causing injury to their house, furniture, 
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and persons. At the first trial, the jury found plaintiffs 
had suffered injury to their real property and assessed dam-
ages in the sum of $10,000; it was specifically found that 
neither plaintiff had sufi'ored any dam::-,ge to his, or her, person. 
A new trial was thereafter granted on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict as to the ''issue 
of damages only." At the conclusion of the second trial, 
the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the Jury in 
the above entitled action, assess plaintiffs' damages in the 
sum of $9541.00; and our verdict is for the plaintiffs, CHARLES 
KoRNOFF and ELEANOR KoRNOFF, husband and wife, and 
against the defendant, KINGSBURG CoTTON OIL CoMPANY, a 
corporation, for said amount." A judgment was thereafter 
entered and defendant appeals. 
At the second trial on the sole issue of damages, the jury 
was instructed as follows : 
"If, under the Court's instructions, you should find that 
plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict for a sum greater than 
merely nominal damages, then you shall determine the items 
of claimed detriment which I am now about to mention, 
provided you find each of such items to have been suffered 
by plaintiffs, and provided further that you find each of such 
items to have been suffered by plaintiffs as the proximate 
result of the act or acts of trespass complained of: 
"1. Such sum as will reasonably compensate the said plain-
tiffs for the damage to their real property. That sum is equal 
to the difference in the fair market value of the real property 
immediately before and after the injury; provided, however, 
that if the injury has b2en repaired, or be capable of repair, 
so as to restore the fair market value of plaintiffs' real 
property as it existed immediately before the injury, at an 
expense less than such difference in value, then the measure 
of damage is the expense of such repair, rather than such 
difference in value. 
'' 2. Such sum as will reasonably compensate plaintiffs as 
the owner-occupants of the land, including members of their 
household, for discomfort and annoyance to them, if any, 
proximately caused by the act or acts of trespass complained 
of. The amount of damages to be awarded for this element 
of the injury, if any, is left to the sound judgment and 
discretion of the jury based upon the evidence, and without the 
necessity of any witness having given his opinion with respect 
to the amount of such damar,rs, if any." (Emphasis added.) 
The jury was instructed at defendant's request that plain-
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tiffs had suffered a trespassory invasion "(more or les."' 
continuous in nature the cotton ginning season)": 
also at defendant's request, that the sum which would 
reasonably compensate plaintiffs for the damage to their real 
property was the ''sum to the difference in the fair 
market value of the real property immediately before and 
after the however, that if the injury ha.<~ 
been or be capable of repair, so as to restore the 
fair market value of plaintiffs' real property as it existed 
immediately before the injury, at an expense less than such 
difference in value, then the measure of damage is the expense 
of such repair rather than such difference in value." 
At the trial, plaintiffs' attorney argued that plaintiffs were 
seeking past, present and future damages for the injury to 
their real property. Defendant contends that where a con-
tinuing trespass is involved, as distinguished from a per-
manent trespass, future damages are not recoverable. While 
no instruction was given the jury concerning the distinction 
between permanent and continuing trespass, the following 
statement was made by the court in the presence of the jury: 
"Now, I'll repeat a question. Mr. Say, that I asked you 
in the absence of the jury. Is it the contention of your 
clients, Mr. and Mrs. Kornoff, that the alleged damage that 
they complain of in this suit is permanent and that it will 
continue in the future and that they are asking damages now 
for all of the adverse effects which have happened in the 
past and which may happen in the future from the operation 
of this gin of the defendant's ~ 
"Mr. Say: Yes, your Honor, I think the word which I 
may put into the record, that we are asking for damages for 
past, future, present and prospective damages. 
''The Court: Will you proceed with your case, Mr. Bar-
rett.'' 
The record shows that the trespass occurs only during the 
ginning season of each year-a period of approximately six 
months; that the action was brought in 1953; that defend-
ant's operations commenced in 1951. The parties apparently 
treated the trespass as permanent because of its recurrent 
character, rather than as a continuous trespass. The defend-
ant's requested instructions, which were given, gave as the 
measure of damages that for a permanent trespass, although 
during the second trial, defendant's counsel argued that 
future damages were not recoverable. 
[1] The general rule appears to be that where a trespass 
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a permanent nature, all and pros-
pective, are recoverable in one action, but where the trespass 
is temporary in character, only those damages may be recov-
ered which have accrued up to the time of the commencement 
of the action, since it is not to be presumed that the trespass 
will continue. (24 Cal.Jur., p. 69G; Carbine v. 126 
Cal.App.2d 386 [272 P.2d 849].) In Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 
58 Cal.App.2d 864, 870 [137 P.2d 713]. an action for eject-
ment to enforce the removal of defendant's line from 
the property of plaintiff, and for damages for the use and 
occupation of the land was involved. 'The court said: 
''Though the right to sue for ejectment and damages may 
be exercised in the same action by reason of section 427, sub-
division 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, they are never-
theless independent and inconsistent causes of action based 
upon the same invasion of the same right. \VhQre, therefore, 
a party elects to sue for damages past and prospective he is 
deemed to have waived the invasion and consented to the 
continned occupancy of the land. Such is the rule of the 
majority of the cases. (1'oolcer v. l~f?:ssouri P. &: L. Co., 336 
Mo. 592 [80 S.W.2d 691, 101 A.L.R. 365] ; Thompson v. 
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 191 Iowa 35 [179 N.W. 191]; Griffin 
v. Jacksonville etc. Ry. Co., 33 Fla. 606 [15 So. 338]; 18 
Am.Jur. p. 166; Hussey v. Bryant, 95 Me. 49 [49 A. 56]; 
Pinkham v. ChelrnsfMd, 109 Mass. 225; Hawver v. Omaha, 
52 Neb. 734 [73 N.W. 217]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117 
Iowa 43 [90 N.W. 510] ; Barnes v. Peck, 283 Mass. 618 [187 
N.E. 176] ; and Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 
124 U.S. 581 [8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527].)" In Thompson 
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 191 Iowa 35 [179 N.W. 191], plain-
tiff recovered and collected a judgment for damages for the 
market value of his land caused by defendant's construction 
and maintenance of a railway embankment He sued again 
for additional damages. It was held that he was bound by 
his election because, in the first suit, he treated the invasion 
as a permanent injury to his land, recovered damages based 
upon a substantial reduction in the market value of his land, 
and proceeded upon the theory that he shonld be treated as 
having cheaper land because the permanent and wrongful 
construction wonld injure his land at future times as it had in 
the past. [2] In Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d, 265, 267 
et seq. [239 P.2d 625], which involved a nuisance, this court 
said: "The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a 
suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages 
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as new injuries ocenrred. Situations arose, where 
injunctive relief was not appropriate or where successive 
actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff or the de-
fendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some 
types of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in 
such cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages 
were allowed in one action. (Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. 
Elec. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 622 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 
149]; ~Williams v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 624, 626-628 
[89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639, 641 [271 P. 
1050]; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp. 504-505.) 
"The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trrspass is 
the one where the offending structure or condition is main-
tained as a necessary part of the operations of a public utility. 
Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite duration 
and since the utility by making compensation is entitled 
to continue them, it is appropriate that only one action should 
be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would 
be unfair to the utility to subject it to successive suits and 
unfair to the injured party if he were not alkwed to recover 
all of his probable damages at once. (See M.•.1Jormic.k, Dam-
ages for Anticipated Injnry to Land, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 574, 
584-585.) 
"A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the 
defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or 
trespass but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is 
willing that it continue if he can secure full compensation 
for both pa8': and anticipated future injuries. To attempt 
categorically to classify such a nuisance as either permanent 
or not may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of 
the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not per-
manent and sues only for past damages, he may be met with 
the plea of res judicata in a later action for additional injury 
if the court then decides the nuisance was permanent in 
character from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 
58 Cal.App.2d 864, 870 [137 P.2d 713] .) Similarly, if the 
initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has 
suffered substantial damage and the court then determines 
that the nuisance was permanent, the defendant may be able 
to raise the defense that the statute of limitations ran from 
the time of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasa-
dena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 6251.) On the other 
hand, if the defendant is willing and able to abate the 
nuisance, it is unfair to award damages on the theory that 
OcL Kor~NOPF v. KINGSBURG CoTTON OrL Co. 
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it will continue. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261, 
265 P. 300j; cf., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 
366 [2 P.2d 7DO] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 
218 Cal. 559, 567 [24 P.2d 495].) 
"Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that 
doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to 
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v. 
191 CaL 746, 752 [218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833] ; see 
Hcstatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127, 
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sntherland on Damages [4th ed.], § 1046, 
p. If the dclenclant is not privileged to continue the 
naisa11ce and is able to abate it, he cannot complain if the 
plaintiff elects to bring succe~;sive actions as damages accrue 
until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 
27 Cal.2c1 10,!, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]; Strong v. Sullivan, 
180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 343].) On the 
other hand, if it appears improbable as a practical matter 
that the nuisance can or will be abated, the plaintiff should 
not be left to the troublesome remedy of successive actions. 
(See Restatement, Torts, § 930, comment c; McCormick, Darn-
ages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 Harv.lJ.Rev. 574, 
594-595.) '' 
In the present case, defendant's ginning mill is lawfully 
Ol)erated in a location properly zoned therefor and need not, 
or may not (Code Civ. Proc., § 731a), be abated. If plain-
tiffs are not permitted to sur for all damages, past, present 
and future, then they must bring suecessive actions each year 
at the close of each ginning season with the ~ttendant risk 
that the court may determine that the trespass occurring 
the previous year was a permanent one for which plaintiffs 
had been theretofore adequately compensated. 
It appears that here plaintiffs elected to sue for all dam-
ages past, present and future and that sueh damages 
are recoverable under the rule heretofore set forth (Spaulding 
v. Camemn, supra, 38 Cal.2c1 265). 
[3] Defendant argues that damages for discomfort and 
annoyance are erroneously awarded in the absence of personal 
injury. 'l'his argument centers around the heretofore quoted 
instruction and upon the ground that plaintiffs did not allege 
such discomfort awl annoyance. Plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint shows that the ''comfort and enjoyment of the plain-
tiffs and their family of their said home have been diminished 
to the extent that they have been unable to live normally 
and peacefully and follow ordinary pursuits, that the use 
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of said eurtailed due to the said dust 
have been deprived 
value of same." It was also alleged that they 
had suffered severe nervous distress and mental anguish. The 
pleading would seem to be sufficient to permit damages for dis-
comfort and annoyance if such damages are otherwise proper. 
[ 4] It appears to us that the discomfort and annoyance 
suffered by plaintiffs is an injury directly and proximately 
caused by defendant's invasion of their property and that 
such damages would naturally result from such an invasion. 
It also appears to us that discomfort and annoyance may be 
suffered where there is no physical injury suffered. [5] In 
Herzog v. Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 219, 225 [259 P.2d 429], the trial 
court found that plaintiffs were caused to suffer "nervousness, 
worry, and mental distress for the safety of themselves and 
their daughter and others obliged to use said road on account 
of the dangerous conditions under which said defendant, 
Paul J. Grosso, forced them ... to use said parcels ... in 
going to and from their said home.'' vV e said: ''Once a 
cause of action for trespass or nuisance is established, an 
occupant of lnnd may recover damages for annoyance and 
discomfort that would naturally ensue therefrom. (Anderson 
v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 825. 83:3 [243 P.2d 497]; Judson v. Los 
Angeles Suburban (]as Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581, 
21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 18:3] ; Thompson v. Simonds, 
68 Cal.App.2d 151, 162 [155 P.2d 870]; Hest., Torts,§ 929(c), 
com. g.) In Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778 [214 P.2d 
50], an action for damages resulting from blasting operations, 
the court sustained an award for discomfort, fright, and 
shock caused by a blast that occurred at a time when plaintiff 
was not at home. The court stated: 'Plaintiff testified that 
after the February :3 blast (in which a rock destroyed a bench 
on the property Jwar >Yh ieh one of his daughters was stand-
ing) he could not rest or sleep beeause of fear for his own 
security and that of his family. 'l'his is a form of discomfort 
for which plaintiff under the circumstances of this case is 
entitled to recover, as well as for other discomfort not chal-
lenged on appeal.' (95 Cal.App.2d at 788.) Similarly, in 
the present case the suffering caused by fear for the safety 
of the daughter and visitors was a natural consequence of 
defendant's conduct and an invasion of a protectible interest 
of an occupant of real property. The cases relied upon by 
defendant did not involve an invasion of a protectible interest 
in real property and are therefore not controlling here." 
Oct. v. KINGSBURG CoTTON OIL Co. 
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Defendant here challenges the applicability of the above 
quoted cases on the theory that the lack of sleep, fear, and 
shock suffered by plaintiff there were injuries to the pl'rson 
and that discomfort and annoyance were a part thereof. \V e 
do not so construe II erzog v. Grosso. \Ve speeifically held 
that annoyance and discomfort were natural consequences of 
such "an invasion of a protectible interest in real property." 
[6] While defendant's trespass here is not of the type to 
cause fright or shock or even physical illness (as found by 
the jury), it obviously is of the type to cause plaintiffs much 
annoyancr and discomfort. Plaintiffs' property-lawns. flow-
ers, shrubs, window screens, hedges and furniture are, during 
the ginning season which lasts for approximately six months 
of each year, covered with a thick coating of dust and lint 
and ginning waste. This was specifically found to be a tres-
pass and an injury to the real property. The annoyance 
and discomfort suffered by plaintiffs as a result of the injury 
to the real property is a natural consequence thereof. 
[7] Section 929 of the R0statement of Torts sets forth the 
rule as follows : '' \Vhere a person is entitled to a judgment for 
harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amount-
ing to a total destruction in value, the damages include 
compensation for ... (c) discomfort and annoyance, in 
an action brought by the occupant." (Emphasis added.) 
"Comment on Clause (c): g. Discomfort and other bodily 
and mental harms. Discomfort and annoyance to an occu-
pant of the land and to the members of his hous0hold are 
distinct grounds of compensation for which in ordinary cases 
the person in possession is allowed to recover in addition to 
the harm to his proprietary interests. He is also allowed to 
recover for his own serious sickness or oth0r substantial bodily 
harm but is not allowed to recover for such serious harm to 
other members of the household, except so far as he maintains 
an action as a husband, parent or child, under the rules 
stated in §§ 693 and 703, vol. III. The owner of land who 
is not an occupant is not entitled to recover for such harms 
except as they may have affected the rental value of his land." 
This section was relied upon by the court in Alonso v. Hills, 
95 Cal.App.2d 778 [214 P.2d 50], where blasting was involved. 
The court there, speaking of the case of Cook v. Maier, 
33 Cal.App.2d 581 [92 P.2d 434], said (p. 787): "That 
case, which involves fright caused by one isolated negligent 
collision in plaintiff's immediate proximity is not in point 
here where the distress and fright were caused by repeated 
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blastings which injured real and disturbed 
its comfortable enjoyment both by their immediate impact 
and the reasonable fear of future danger. 'l'he recovery 
snch 1:nvaswn of his in the real to which 
the owner-occupant is entitled includes discomfort ancl annoy-
ance Torts, § 929 (c) ; Judson v. Los Angeles 
Suburban Gas Co., 157 CaL 168, 172 P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas. 
1247, 26 L.R.A.?\.S. 183]; Dauberman v. 198 Cal. 586, 
590 [246 P. 319. 48 A.L.R. 12<!4]; Green v. Geneml Pcirolcmn 
205 Cal ::128. 337 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R. . ) " In 
Green v. Gnural Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 386, 337 
[270 P. 9:52, 60 A.hR. 475], an action for damages for tres-
pass because of oil drilling operations was involved. 'l'he 
trial court specifically found that defendants had not been 
negligPnt. Plaintiffs were forced to leave their home, and 
this court said: "No special damag·es, such as cost of removal 
from the premises, loss of r(,ntals of the premises, or cost 
of renting another home, were alleged or proved. \Ve are 
not, however, left to speculation as to the basis on which 
the trial court fixed the amount of the damages allowed for 
eviction. The law afl'ords redress by givi11g damages against 
a wrongdoer for the annoyance and discomforts sufFered in 
such cases as thi~." Apparently no personal injuries w·ere 
suffered in the Green case. In Dauberrnan v. Grant, 198 Cal. 
586, 590 [246 P. 319, 48 A.L.R. 1244], an action for damages 
for nuisance was involved. Defendant there maintained a 
smokestack on premises adjoining those of the plaintiff; smoke 
therefrom was emitted to plainiiff's dwelling house. 'l'his 
court said: ''It was not nrr'• ssary to the recovery of damages 
caused by the nnisance of ·mwke and soot to prove actual 
damage to plaintiff's property. She was entitled to recover 
for the personal discomfort and annoyance to which she had 
been subjected and it was a question for the trial court to 
determine the amount of the compensation which she should 
receive. (.htdson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., .mpra.)" 
Apparently physical injury was not involved in the Dauber-
man case. In Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 
Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 hR.A.N.S. 
183 J, an action for damages for opETating a nuisance in the 
form of a gasworks was involved. The court there said 
(p. 170): "There is no proof that plaintiff's land has depre-
ciated; that its rental value has been impaired; nor that the 
health of Mr. Judson or that of any member of his family has 
been injuriously affected by the operation of defendants· 
KoRNOFF v. Kmosm:mo CoTTON On, Co. 275 
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He did assert, however, that the 
the manufactnre of gas at de:i'endants' 
works interfered with his comfortable enjoyment of his 
property .... 
''In order that a judgment of this character may be upheld, 
it is not nec<'ssary that the health of piaintiff or of members 
of his household should have been impaired. It is sufficient 
and smoke were offensive to the senses. 
23 N.J.Eq. 201: Coker v. Birge, 9 Ga. t!28 
[54 Am.Dec. :347]; Cleveland v. C1:tizens Gas Light Co., 20 
N .. J .Eq. 206: Bohan v. Port J erv1s Gas Light Co., 122 N.Y. 
23 [25 N.E. ; Hayden v. Tuckc1·, 37 l\Io. 221.)" In 
Anderson v. 38 Cal.2d 825 [243 P.2cl 497], an action 
was brought seeking damages for the maintenance of a nui-
sance through the operation of an airport. In that case this 
conrt affirmed an award of damages to certain of the plaintiffs 
for the annoyance and discomfort caused by defendants' 
operation of the airport. Defendants contend that the Ander-
son case is disting-uishable on the ground that there plaintiffs 
testified that they had become hysterical, vomited and suffered 
impaired health. 'I'he court, in affirming the award of dam-
ages for discomfort and annoyauce, relied upon Judson v. 
Los Angeles S1tbnrban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 
581. 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 2ti L.R.A.N.S. 183], and Alonso v. 
Hills, 9i:i Cal.A.pp.2d 778, 787-788 1214 P.2d 50]. In the 
Judson case no impairment of plaintiff's health was involved; 
in the Alonso case, the court uoted that $1,000 in damages 
was awarded for "plaintiff's distress in body and mind, dis-
comfort and annoyance, fright and shock; ... '' 
[8] The California cases appear to draw no distinction 
between eases involving nuisance and those involving trespass 
in permitting an award of damages for discomfort and annoy-
ance directly resultiug from an injury to real property. There 
seems to be no sound reason to refuse to award damages for 
diseomfort and annoyance where the only injury is to the 
I'''al property since it is obvious that such an ll1JUry may 
c-ause discomfort and annoyance without also causing an 
adual physical injnry to the person. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. Schauer, J., concurred in the judg-
ment. 
